Leland D. Moran v. Georgia R. Shaw : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Leland D. Moran v. Georgia R. Shaw : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Moran v. Shaw, No. 15217 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/664
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LELAND D. MORAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GEORGIA R. SHAW, Acting Director, 
Utah State Department of Public 
Safety, Driver's License Division, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 240884 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the District Court's affirma-
tion of a Driver's License Revocation Hearing revoking Appel-
!ant's driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical 
test pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
A non-jury trial de novo was held on April 19, 1977, 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Judge presiding, the 
Court having taken the matter under advisement and on or about 
April 20, 1977, the lower Court entered a Judgment against Ap-
pellant denying Appellant's Petition for restoration of his 
driver's license, determining that the Appellant unreasonably 
refused to submit to a chemical test pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
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tated, Section 41-6-44.10, (1953), as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
AFFIRMATION OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was operating a motor vehicle on public higt 
way I-80 approximately 13 miles east of ~vendover, Utah, on Dec-
ember 24, 1976, at approximately 11:00 p.m. A Utah Highway 
Patrolman, Gary Ogilvie, caught Appellant's car on radar going 
82 m.p.h. and weaving and proceeded to pull him over. 
The Appellant was thereafter arrested for driving whil 
under the influence of alcohol, read the Miranda warning, and 
was then transported to the jail in Wendover, Utah. 
An officer Nelson arrived at the jail a short time 
later to administer the breathalyzer test. Appellant demanded 
that the officers find and appoint him an attorney. The testi-
mony was that both the officers explained it was not their duty 
do so, but that he could use the phone to contact an attorney 
himself. This opportunity \'las held open to him during the ent: 
time he was at the jail. Appellant actually made calls, but h' 
only calls were to try and find a particular casino girl, he 
didn't find her. 
At various times the officers explained the implied cc 
law to the Appellant and the consequences of his refusal. Ap-
pellant staunchly refused to submit to the test whenever apprc 
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Appellant's physical condition and demeanor were testi-
fied to as being "hair mussed, eyes red, speech slightly slurred, 
unsteady on his feet, alcohol on his breath, belligerient, loud, 
and argumentative." The conversations between Appellant and 
the officers finally ended in a scuffle wherein Appellant was 
pushed into a cell. Thereafter, Appellant refused to respond to 
the officers. Some time after, the arresting officer had finished 
reading the implied consent statute, verbatim, to the Appellant, 
while in the cell snoring was heard. Previously both officers 
fully explained the consent statute to Appellant. Appellant 
was released the following day. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED 
BY Al1PLE COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
This Court in Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197, {Utah, 
1975), stated that it will not reverse the trial judge unless 
he clearly does violence to the facts. Respondent contends that 
the trial court's decision is supported by substantial competent 
evidence and should be upheld. 
The trial judge, Stewart M. Hansen Jr., found Appellant 
was properly instructed with respect to the implied consent law, 
that Appellant unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test. 
This conditional demand that an attorney be appointed for him 
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was unreasonable under the circumstances. Appellant was not 
denied his right to contact counsel. All of his findings are 
supported by substantial competent evidence and should not be 
disturbed under the prior holdings of this court. 
Point II 
APPELLANT WAS FULLY INFORMED AND UNDERSTOOD 
THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAtv AND HIS RIGHTS. 
The District Court's findings of fact that Appellant 
was properly instructed with respect to the implied consent s~t 
is clearly substantiated by the evidence. Before Appellant was 
taken to the jail, Trooper Ogilvie explained the test and re-
quested him to submit to a breathalyzer test when they arrived 
there. (Tr. p. 8-9). Officer Ogilvie read the Appellant part 
of the implied consent statute before Appellant was put in his 
cell and finished reading it verbatim a few minutes afterwards. 
(Tr. p. 11, 19, 20). It should be noted that the implied con-
sent statute does not require a verbatim reading. This is 
just a practice of the department. (See Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-44.10). 
The arresting officers testified that at various times 
Appellant's rights under the implied consent statute and the 
consequences of his refusal to submit to a test were fully ex-
plained to him. (Tr. p. 9-11, 13, 19, 20, 25). 
In Elliot v. Dorius, 557 P.2d 759 (1976), petitioner 
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argued that since the officers explained his rights before his 
refusal to take the test, rather than immediately after, the 
statute was not complied with. This Court held that "form should 
not be alleviated above substance," and that plaintiff had been 
sufficiently informed of his rights. In this case, Appellant 
was advised concerning his rights. Furthermore, any disjointment 
of the explanation was due to Appellant's belligerent behavior and 
argumentative attitude, aud he should not be allowed now to bene-
fit from his uncooperative and dangerous behavior. 
Point III 
APPELLANT UNREASONABLY RE~USED TO TAKE THE 
BREATHALYZER TEST OFFERED HIM. 
The evidence also supports the District Court's findings 
of fact that the Appellant did refuse the test and that his re-
fusal was unreasonable since it was strictly conditioned upon 
the officer's appointing him an attorney. This is clearly not 
the law. 
On the way to jail, officer Ogilvie explained the test to 
the Appellant and asked him to submit to it. Appellant unqualifiedly 
refused. Appellant stated that he had been to an office party 
earlier in the day and'knew he would go over." He further retorted 
he would fight the officer all the way on it. (Tr. p. 9). 
The foregoing evidence indicates Appellant's belligerance 
and undermines Appellant's contention that the only reason for his 
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refusal was his desire to consult with his attorney, that was 
also argued before the trial judge. Appellant was given furt~r 
opportunities to submit to the test and replied that he wouldn't 
until he had an attorney present and demanded that the officers 
get him one. (Tr. p. 11, 12, 25, 26). 
The Appellant's refusals under the circumstances were 
found by the trial court to be tantarrount to express, unconditior. 
refusals. The officers made it perfectly clear to Appellant 
that it was not their duty to appoint him an attorney. The of-
ficers told him "he could make all the calls he wanted." (Tr. 
p. 11). Appellant had his attorney's card with him, yet he madE 
calls, not to his attorney, but to find a casino girl(Tr. p. 11) 
When he couldn't contact her, he made no further effort to conta 
an attorney, although the phone was always available to him. 
He continued to insist that the officers appoint him an attorney 
which, as the officers had explained, was not their duty. After 
Appellant was put in a cell, officer Ogilvie told him he would 
wait for a while until he made up his mind about calling an at-
torney. (Tr. p. 13). Appellant choose not to respond any 
further but ignored the officers. 
Appellant refers to Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 
451 P.2d 877 (1969), in stating that refusal to take the test 
until an attorney was consulted was not a refusal. Hunter's 
facts are quite different than Appellant's. There, the petitW 
had made a bona fide effort to contact her attorney for thir~ 
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minutes. Fifteen minutes later, after the officer had written 
up an affidavit containing plaintiff's refusal, plaintiff's 
attorney finally made contact and advised plaintiff to submit 
to the test. The petitioner in Hunter, told the officer to give 
him the test and the officer refused. There was no undue delay 
in Hunter so the court held that plaintiff had not refused under 
the statute. Even in the context of these facts, Justice Ellett 
wrote a strong dissent concluding that delay was unreasonable 
and unjustified and that there was a refusal to submit to a 
chemical test. 
In the case at bar, Appellant's only effort to get an 
attorney consisted of a call to find a casino girl. He had 
his attorney's card and full use of the telephone but made no 
effort to call him or to get a local attorney. Appellant did 
not eventually request the test as in Hunter, but refused to 
take, submit, and make possible for the officers to administer the 
test. It appears from this record that Appellant was not 
that concerned about having an attorney present and just wanted to 
delay. 
Appellant also construes the reasoning in Hyde v. Dorius, 
549 P.2d 451, Utah (1976), to support his contention that he 
neither refused nor submitted to the test, therefore, he has 
not refused. Again, the facts in Hyde are quite contrary to 
those presently before the court. In Hyde, the alleged refusal 
came within five minutes after the arrest while the plaintiff 
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never again offered an opportunity to take a test and this cour 
rules that four or five minutes was not a reasonable time withi 
\Jhich to make a sentient consent or refusal. There was no con-
structive refusal thereafter since there was no further request 
no further refusal. Again Justice Ellet wrote a powerful disH: 
stating that the evidence showing that the officers explained l 
consent statute at least on two occassions and that petitioner'; 
only response that she wanted to go home was sufficient to just: 
the District Court's conclusion that there was a refusal. 
In the case of bar, Appellant was given many opportuni: 
to take the test and refused each time. The belligerance and 
unjustified conditional refusals under the circumstances amountE 
to express refusals. Appellant was given two hours in which tc 
contact an attorney and submit to the test. (Tr. 21). The tri, 
judge's view of the evidence that the Appellant did actually 
refuse to submit to a breathalyzer test and his refusal certain] 
was unreasonable under the circumstances, should be upheld. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS AND MADE HIS 
CONSCIOUS CHOICE TO REFUSE THE CHEMICAL TEST. 
As discussed above, trooper Ogilvie explained the imp!: 
consent law and the consequences of Appellant's refusal on nume' 
ous occasions, so Appellant was aware of his choice and his riq· 
thereunder. 
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Appellant's attitude as alleged to earlier, ie., 
"I'll fight you all the way," caused the agitation that 
existed. It did not prevent him from making his choice, 
but rather indicated his choice not to submit to the test. 
This agitation caused by the Appellant should not be allowed 
in any way to bear favorably on his case, but rather that 
Appellant understood and just wanted to delay or cause 
trouble so he wouldn't have to take the test. 
Point V 
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
After arresting the Appellant, officer Ogilvie 
read to him the Miranda warning. Later at the jail it was 
clearly explained to Appellant that he had a right to contact 
counsel for himself and that it was not the duty of the of-
ficers to find and appoint him an attorney. It was also 
made clear that the "appointment" right referred to an ar-
raignment and not to the chemical test proceeding. (Tr. 12, 
25). 
A phone was made available to Appellant for quite 
some time (Tr. 12). Appellant contends he reasonably believed 
he could only make one phone call. The evidence does not 
support the contention (Tr. 11-12). 
Appellant contends that his demand for an attorney 
constituted a reasonable delay. His authority, Peterson v. 
~' 547 P.2d 693, Utah (1976), does not support this 
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case on the merits. In Peterson, the petitioner stated 
she would take the test when her attorney _.got there. The 
attorney was contacted and took 45 minutes to arrive at the 
jail which the court found to be a reasonable length of 
time. The officer, knowing the attorney was on his way, 
left five or ten minutes before he arrived. The majority 
concluded that there was no refusal because the delay was 
reasonable and it appeared that the concern of the petitioner 
and the effort of the attorney were bonafide. Even though 
the plaintiff did not expressly refuse, a strong dissent 
concluded that a 45 minute delay, even with the attorney 
actually on his way, was an unreasonable delay and that the 
petitioner did unreasonably refuse to submit to a test. 
The Appellant in the case at bar did not even 
make an honest effort to contact an attorney, let alone be 
waiting for one to arrive. Therefore, the Peterson case 
was found not applicable by the trial court in this case. 
Point VI 
PUBLIC SAFETY DICTATES AN EFFICIENT AND 
EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH DRUNK 
DRIVERS. 
Driving an automobile is a statutory privilege 
so the strict rigidities of the criminal system are not 
mandatory in a license revocation proceeding. It is a well-
known fact that drunk drivers are the greatest cause of 
highway fatalities. Because alcohol in the blood dissipates 
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there is no place for delay tactics on the part of any 
party who mixes alcohol with driving. The test will also 
clear an innocent driver. 
In this case, Appellant was driving 82 m.p.h. in 
an allegedly intoxicated condition. 
CONCLUSION 
The whole tenor of Appellant's behavior was one 
of delay and beligerance. Appellant stated he would go over 
if the test was given and apparently from the evidence pre-
sented was really not that concerned about having an attorney 
present. After he was put in his cell, he refused to re-
spond further. In light of the public concern for safety 
on the highways such antics should not be tolerated by the 
law of this state or this Court. Therefore, the conclusions 
of the trial Judge who actually heard the evidence should 
be sustained by This Honorable Court. 
DATED this _______ day of December, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
this day of December, 1977, toP. Robert Knight, 
1606 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
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